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PREFACE
The work described in this report was performed by the Quality
•	 Assurance and Reliability Office of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory.
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ABSTRACT
Mariner 10, which derived its design pedigree from the JPL Mariner
series, was highly successful and contributed significant data toward the
understanding of our solar system. The success of the mission with regards
to a long-term space environment allows further data to be added to our
reservoir of knowledge about the behavior of electronic equipment in space.
This report discusses the problems and failures encountered in flight and
summarizes the data available through a quantitative accounting of all elec-
tronic piece parts on the spacecraft. It also shows computed failure rates
for electronic piece parts. It is intended that these computed data be used in
the continued updating of the failure rate base used for trade-off studies and
predictions for future JPL space missions.
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II. INTRODUCTION
Mariner 10 derived its design pedigree from the JPL Mariner series.
The success of the mission contributed significant data toward the under-
standing of our solar system.
On Sunday, March 16, 1975, Mariner 10 had operated in space continu-
ously for more than 16 months. The spacecraft had completed its second
176-day orbit around the Sun. During that same 6-month period, since Mari-
ner 10's second Mercury encounter (September 21, 1974), the planet had
rotated three times on its axis and completed two of its own 88-day orbits
around the Sun. This planned coincidence had permitted the third and final
encounter with the East-moving planet. In eight more days, Mariner 10 was
to have completed its extended mission assignment and exhausted its
attitude control gas.
Mariner 10 used the last of its attitude control gas supply at approxi-
mately 11:25 GMT on March 24, 1975, and the spacecraft transmitter was
turned off for the last time. The historic flight of Mariner 10 was over,
506 days and nearly 1.6 billion kilometers (1 billion miles) of travel from
liftoff on November 3, 1973.
This report discusses the problems and failures encountered in flight
and summarizes the data available through a quantitative accounting of all
electronic piece parts on the spacecraft. It also shows computed failure
rates for electronic piece parts. It is intended that these computed data be
used in the continuing updating of the failure rate base used for trade-off
studies and predictions for future JPL space missions.
•	 II. MARINER VENUS/MERCURY 1973 PROJECT DESCRIPTION
The mission objectives established by NASA were as follows:
Primary: To conduct exploratory investigations of the planet
Mercury's environment, atmosphere, surface, and
body characteristics during the 1973 Mercury
opportunity.
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Secondary: To obtain environmental and atmospheric data from Vents
during the flyby of Venus, to perform interplanetary experi-
ments while the spacecraft is enroute from Earth to
Mercury, and to obtain experience with a dual-planet,
gravity-assist mission.
The project started with several restraints that were "firsts" for a
JPL-managed program. The most important, of course, was the require-
ment not to exceed $98 million in costs. There was to be a single launch on
an Atlas/Centaur vehicle. The spacecraft would be a Mariner-class vehicle
and make maximum use of existing hardware and technology. The spacecraft's
TV cameras would take th° first pictures of both Venus and Mercury. The
mis= i on would be the first multiplanet mission and the first to use a gravity-
assist technique. And, for the first time since Surveyor, a spacecraft sys-
tem contractor was engaged in a JPL-managed space program.
The Mariner 10 scientific instrument complement was selected with the
primary objective of conducting an exploratory investigation of Mercury. A
brief description of the experiments follows:
(1) A dual fluxgate magnetometer, mounted on a 6-m boom, mea-
sured magnetic fields.
(2) A plasma science instrument measured energy and directional
spectra of solar wind protons and electrons.
(3) A charged-particle telescope measured high-energy ions and
electrons.
(4) Two extreme ultraviolet spectrometers (occultation spectrometer
and airglow spectrometer) measured pressure and composition of
t'^e Hermian atmosphere.
(5) A body-mounted infrared radiometer measured surface thermal
properties.
(6) Television cameras provided high-resolution imaging at long
slant range. The cameras had eight position filter wheels to
select effective wavelengths of 355 to 578 nm,
W
t
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III. GENERAL SPACECRAFT DESCRIPTION
The Mariner Venus/Mercury 1973 (MVM'73) spacecraft was designed,
built, and tested by the Boeing Aerospace Company, Kent, Washington, under
the direction of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory. The spacecraft design was
derived from the JPL Mariner series, with some new subsystems and
special modifications as required by its sunward trajectory. Table I
lists the subsystems and responsible organizations for these subsystems.
Celestial references for the three-axis stabilized spacecraft were the Sun
and the star Canopus. Principal features of the thermal design include the
large sunshade located below the octagonal ''bus'' structure (which housed the
spacecraft electronic subassemblies), the rotational capability of the solar
panels, and the automatically activated thermal control louvers on the upper
five sides of the bus. Rotation of the solar panels about their long axes was
to reduce the projected panel area as viewed from the Sun and hence mini-
mize the solar heating of the panels. This technique successfully maintained
heat input and electrical output within acceptable limits throughout the total
flight range of 1 to 0.46 AU. The spacecraft weighed 502 kg at injection,
including 29 kg of hydrazine rocket motor propellant and Z. 7 ke of attitude
control nitrogen gas. Following the successful launch of the flight MVM'73
spacecraft, the spacecraft was redesignated Mariner 10.
IV. COMPARISON TO PREVIOUS MARINER SPACECRAFT FROM
ELECTRONIC PIECE PART VIEWPOINT
Failure rate computations based on data from the Mariner Mars 1969
(MM 1 69) mission were performed in 1971 by P. O. Chelson (see Ref. 2).
Table 2 compares the piece part complexities of the Mariner Mars 1969
spacecraft, the Mariner Mars 1971 (MM 1 71) spacecraft, and the Mariner
Venus/Mercury 1973 spacecraft.
Of the many electronic piece part types used on the Mariner space-
craft, one type stands alone as having a significant increase in usage between
the MM' 71 Project and the MVM' 73 Project. T'^ ,.e microcircuit (integrated
circuit)-type part usage per spacecraft increased from 3063 to 4756 or about
a 55% increase. To further assess the impact of this growth, an internal
examination of integrated circuit (IC) devices was performed. The individual
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Table 1. MVM'73 spacecraft subsystem responsibility (Ref. 1)
Subsystem	 Design and fabricatiun
designator	 Subsystem	 responsibility
2000 System Boeing
2001 Structure, STRU Boeing
2002 Radio frequency, RFS Boeing
2003 Modulation/ demodulation,
MDS Boeing
2004 Power, PWR Boeing
?005 Central computer and
sequencer, CC&S Boeing
2006 Flight data	 FDS JPL
2007 Attitude control A/C Boeing
2008 Pyrotechnic JPL
200 r> Cablin; Boe ing
2010 Propulsion, PROP Boeing/JPL
2011 Thermal control, T/C B(,eing/JPL
2012 Mechanical devices Boeing/JPL
2015 Articulation & pointing, APS Boeing
2016 Data storage, DSS Boeing
2017 Antennas Boeing
2032 Plasma science, PSE MIT
2033 Charged- particle
telescope, CPT University of Chicago
2034 Ultraviolet spectrometer, Kitt Peak Observatory
UVS
2035 Magnetometer, MAG GSFC
2036 Television science, 	 TV JPL
2037 X-band transmitter, XTX JPL
2038 Infrared radiometer, IRR Santa Barbara
Research Center
Y
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5Table 2. Recent Mariner spacecraft electronic component piece
Hart usa a summar ag	 Y
Type part MM'69b MM'71b MVM'73b
Capacitors 3221 3957 5074
Crystals 9 8 18
Diodes 4418 4748 5072
Filters 88 104 116
Fuses 69 131 91
Inductors 351 357 357
Microcircuits 2763 3063 4756
Relays 194 261 245
Resistors 9914 11031 13239
Switches 16 17 6
Thermistors 12 33 39
Transformers 338 342 339
Transistors 3035 3296 3062
Miscellaneous 28 3 7
Totals b 24456 27351 32421
circuit elements (i.e., resistor, transistor, etc.) on the IC chip were counted
on the higher population, and representative IC part types used on both the
MM'71 and MVM'73 spacecraft. The individual circuit elements count on the
MM 1 71 Project averaged 38 parts per IC device. On the MVM'73 Project the
count averaged 65 parts per IC device. This increase in circuit element
complexity of about 70 %, when coupled with the increase of IC part usage,
results in an IC growth complexity factor of about 2.6 (MM'71 to MVM'73).
V. MARINER 10 FLIGHT PROBLEMS AND FAILURES
A. REPORTING OF FLIGHT ANOMALIES
The Mission Operations System, operating within the JPL Space Flight
Operations Facility, used the Spacecraft Problem/Failure Reporting (PFR)
form to report anomalies/ failures of spacecraft hardware. The use of the
PFR system during flight was a continuation of the problem/failure reporting
activity which commenced early in the project, when power was first applied
to the flight hardware and continued to launch. There were 41 incidents
reported through the PFR system during mission operations. The listing in
Table 3 shows all 41 problems/failures. The table identifies the subsystem,
date of occurrence, and description of the problem. Of these 41 inciden^s,
15 were considered significant to the health of the spacecraft. Their occur-
rence on a time ordinate is shown in Fig. 1.
B. USE OF REDUNDANCY DURING FLIGHT
Both block and functional redundancies were used to maintain and repair
the operational status of the spacecraft when failures occurred. Block
redundancy (built-in identical backup circuits or hardware) provided fixes for
four failures: (1) Power Subsystem, main to standby inverter transfer (PFR
5021); (2) Power Subsystem, different panel currents (PFR 5027); (3) Power
Subsystem, 87-W power increase (PFR 5031); and (4) Flight Data Subsystem
(FDS), analog to digital converter (A/DC) failure (PFR 5034). Functional
redundancy (restoration of function by equivalent functional approach) pro-
vided work-arounds for five failures: (1) Television Science Subsystem,
optics heater failure (PFR 5001); (2) FDS, power on-reset at gyros on (PFR
5013); (3) roll axis oscillation (PFR 5024); (4) X-band transmitter output
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Table 3. Mariner Venus/Mercury 1973 PFRs
PFROccurrence Description of problem/ failure from
No.	 Subsystem 	 date PFR data bank
5001	 TVS	 11-03-73 TV heaters failed to cycle through
positions.
	
Most likely cause is
leakage path from heater circuit-
raw do power line to chassis, 	 bias-
ing off FDS MOSFETs that control
TV optics heater.	 Optics heater
came on 1-17-74  when direct com-
mand DC-64 sent.
5002	 MIA 	 11-03-73 MAG temperature at -54"C (-66'F),
11. 1° C (20°F) lower than predicted.
Heater function verified by manual
command.	 Not a thermal anomaly;
interpretation problem.
5003	 PSE	 11-03-73 PSE scan package temperature
5. 5 0 C (10"F) below specification
limit:.	 PSE temperature was low
because PSE not on early in mis-
sion and combination of Supple-
mental heater size, test errors,
ar.d lower unregul-ted do supple
voltage.	 No corrective action.
5004	 A/C	 11-03-73 Tracker temperature below speci-
fication limit of -6. 6 ` C (200F).
Tracker temperature was low
because it dissipates less power
when star is acquired than in view-
ing dark field.
	
Temperature only
1. 0 C (2° F) below limit and no per-
formance affect.
JPL Technical Memorandum 33-759
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Table 3 (contd)
PFR Subsystem Occurrence	 Description of problem/failure fromNo.	 date	 PFR data bank
1
5008 SYSTEMS
	 11-03-73
Tr---^ker failed to acquire Vega in
bright ness gate 2. Vega acquisi-
tion missed due to desensitization
of tracker by exposure to Earth.
Recovery completed within 24 h and
is operating satisfactorily.
Camera temperatures exceeded
lower specification limit of -15°C
(5 0 F), due to TV heaters not func-
tioning, reference 1 1 FR 5001. TV
heaters came on 1-12- 74 and camera
temperatures returned to normal.
canning electrostatic analyzer
(SEA) ion and electron -ounts too
low. ]Possible failure modes were:
(1) SEA aperture door failed to
open, (2) SEA analyzer plates
damaged during launch, and (3) com-
ponent or solder failure in SEA
electronics. Cause unknown.
Incorrect s-an clock and cone com-
mands reversed scan platform
operations program (SPOP). All
CC-6 coded commands to be run
through SPOP and command
gene ration.
5005	 A/C	 11-03-73
5006	 T/ C	 11-04-73
5007	 PSE	 11-05-73
Table 3 (contd)
PFR SubsN stern Occurrence
No.	 date
5009
	
PSE	 11-12-73
5010	 A/C	 11-13-73
5011	 A/C	 11-20-73
5012	 TVS	 11-16-73
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Descripii,)n of problem/failure from
PFR data bank
Scanning electron speccrorneter
(SES) channel A has 1881 counts
added to all data. Problem had
cleared when channel A checked on
12- 20-73. SES is sensitive to
2.4-kHz rise time and may have
cleared due to slight change in
ri;e time.
Bright particle caused loss of
Canopus lock. Particle tracked
in plus direction_ and lost. Roll
search to Canopus inhibltea by
setting of roll search inhibit logic
in the A/C electronics. Correc-
tive action s ;.o send DC-21 to
allow roll search.
A/C N 2 gas usage higher than
expected. 9. 07 9/day (20 mlb/
day) initial estimate was based on
insufficient data. Cruise usage
was actually about 4. 54 g/day
(10 mlb/day) per prelaunch
predicts.
Camera A cathode current low at
turn-on. Degradation probably due
to leaving TVS power on due to TV
heaters not coming on (PFR 5001).
Diagnostic tests run and vidicon
beams off in Earth-Venus cruise.
TVS power off in Mercury cruise.
9
Table 3 (cor.td )
PFR	 Occurrence Description of problem/failure fromstemNo.	 Subsy	 date PFR data bank
5013	 SYSTEMS	 11-"L1- _. FDS power-on-reset (POE) when
gyros turned on by command 7M1,
pre-roll control maneuver.
Another POR on day 341. 	 Prob-
able causes are random combin-
ation of normal 2.4-kHz bus dip
at gyro turn-on and converted com-
mon mode noise in FDS.	 Precau-
tions and contingencies now used.
5014	 APS	 11-26 -73 No platform telemetry response to
2 of 8 CC-6 commands. 	 Reference
PFR 5019 for corrective action.
5015	 XTX	 12-07 -73 XTX output power drop from 96 to
90 data numbe rs (DN).
	
Several
6 DN changes in XTX output level
seen since launch, during S/C
maneuver with XTX case temper-
ature of 10'--15. 5' C (50' --60' F).
XTX output is now 1. 5 dB above
requirement.
	
6 DN = 0. 3 dB.
Satisfactory above 15. 5' C (60'F).
5016	 MAG	 11-017-73 MAG flipper :a.iied to complete
stroke.
	
Flipper continued incom-
plete strokes until 2-21-74 when
cable warming to -26. 1' C (-15' F)
allowed complete stroke.	 Work-
around procedure used to ensure
adequate power for flips.
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Table 3 (contd)
PFR Subsystem Occurrence	 Description of problem/failure fromNo.	 date	 PFR data bank
5017	 A / C	 12-07-73
5018	 APS	 12-15-73
5019
	
SYSTEMS	 12-18-73
5020	 SXA	 12-25-73
5 02 1	 SYSTEMS	 01-09-74
J PL Technical Memorandum 33-759
Tracker failed to acquire Canopus
six times. Low temperature, pro-
longed darkness exposure in roll
control maneuver and gate calibra-
tion accuracy caused marginal
acquisition conditions. Use gate
G-2 for future acquisitions after
prolonged dark condition.
Abnormal backlash in cone slews
at 160 deg. Reference PFR 5019
for corrective action.
Scan cone slew sluggish from 150
to 179 deg. Cone limits established.
High-gain antenna (HGA) drive
changed from 84 to 8- DN. Low-
gain antenna (LGA) drive changed
from 0 to 9 DN. Fault in hybrid
cavity or in S-band radiating
cavities. 11 state changes occurred
before final cure on 3-4-74.
Check design and fabrication clean-
liness on future projects.
Power Subsystem went from main
to standby chain. Probably due to
shorted Dickson 1N3892 diode in the
main booster/ regulator. Modify
in-flight sequences to minimize
Power Subsystem stresses.
b
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Table 3 (contd)
PFR
	 stem	 OccurrenceSubsy Description of problem/failure fromNo.	 date PFR data bank
5022	 SYSTEMS	 01-05-74 HGA dir li stopped before reaching
stop position.
	 Curled hGA cabling
wrapped around the HGA boom.
HGA dish position limits set to
avoid problem and incremental
commands used near limits.
5023
	 DSS	 01-10-74 DSS stuck in parking window when
commanded low-rate playback.
Relative humidity in DSS rn- y be
57% to 80%, causing excess cata-
lyst A in magnetic heads to come
out,	 reacting with oxide coating
and causing sticking.	 Park on
window and exit with high torque.
5024
	
A/C	 01-30-74 High-rate roll gyro oscillations
and hiF,h gas use.	 Roll gyro had
steac:y 3. 62-Hz oscillation.	 Exten-
sive tests and analysis indicate
most likely cause is exciting
seventh S/C structural mode. 	 Use
solar sailing to minimize gas use.
5025	 DSS	 02-09-74 DSS tape stuck at left end of tape.
Not in parking window.
	 Reference
PFR 5023 for analysis and corrective
active.
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Table 3 (contd)
PFR
	
Occurrence Description of problem/failure fromSubsystemNo.	 date PFR data bank
5026	 STRU	 03-12-74 Solar panel tilted to 50 deg.
Temperature over 115'C (239'F).
Specification limit of 115' C (239' F)
applies to cell surface. 	 Temper-
' ature transducer on opposite side.
Peak cell temperature was 133. 3' C
(272'F) and average was 126. 1' C
(259'F).	 Flight acceptance tempera-
ture is 120'C (248'F).
5027	 POWER	 03-19-74 On panel tilt to 76 deg,	 current
differential between panels increased.
Probably a partial failure in sec-
tion 1 of -X panel. 	 Cause unknown.
5028	 UVS	 03-20-74 Airglow (AG) high-voltage power
turned off in playback.	 Similar
problem occurred in subsystem
tests on both UVS AG units (Refer-
ence prelaunch PFRs 5802 and 5805),
but no occurrence in system tests.
Commands will be sent during
Mercury encounter to reset UVS AG
' if off at the time of UVS AG state
change.	 No significant change in DSS
• drive volts or power telemetry.
5029	 PROP	 03-21-74 Engine catalyst bed resistance
decrease after post-trajectory cor-
rection maneuver (TCM).	 Drop
after TCM 1 was 16% and after
TCM 2 was 12%.
	
1% = 0. 09% in
delta velocity.
	 Catalyst bed
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Table 3 (contd)
PFR Subsystem Occurrence	 Description of problem/failure from
No.	 date	 PFR data bank
resistance stabilized after TCM 3.
Flight impulse errors less than
1/4 of specification.
5030	 T/C	 03-26-74	 HGA boom temperature exceeded
specification limit of 90'C (194'F).
Cause is unknown. No corrective
action.
5031	 SYSTEMS	 03-30-74	 Spacecraft drawing 87 watts added
power; TV heaters off. Prime sus-
pected cause is booster regulator in
the power conditioning equipment.
Other symptoms include: DSS
drive toggles on/off, no response
to DC-43 and 47, X-band spikes,
+4 V TV power dropped 4 DN, S/C
bus temperature up and ZFS fre-
quency change.
5032	 XTX	 03-30-74	 XTX output dropped from 81 to 3 DN.
Possibly due to loss of voltage
regulation in chopper transformer
circuit. Carrier can be recovered
by turning XTX power off and t'hen
back on.
5033	 MDS
	
03-31-74	 No response to DC-43 (switch
traveling-wave tube to low power).
Switches probably have component
failure or circuit degradation. No
more DC-42's or 43's will be sent.
14	 JPL Technical Memorandum 33-759
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Table 3 (contd)
PFR	 Occurrence Description of problem/failure fromSubsystemNo.	 date PFR data bank
5034	 FDS	 04-16-74 Analog engineering data from FDS
analog/cligital converter 2 went to
127 DN.	 Appears to be due to iso-
lated part failure in FDS.
5035	 POWER	 04-29-74 +X solar panel current increase when
tilted away from Sun.	 Data analysis
reveals all responses normal.
5036
	
PSE	 07-30-74 PSE SES electron multiplier count
rate decreasing.	 Normal wearout.
No corrective action except turn off
until Mercury encounter II. 	 Predict-
able event.
5037	 DSS	 08-19-74 DSS appears jammed approximately
2 1. 3 m (70 ft) from right end of tape.
Probably caused by head-to-tape
weld causing the tape to loop and jam.
Turned off subsystem.
5038	 A/C	 09-04-74 Canopus tracker lost Canopus lock
due to bright particle tracking.
Remain in cruise mode to minimize
oscillations.
5039
	
A/C	 09-05-74 Canopus tracker lost lock, storm of
bright particles.
	
Same analysis and
closure action as PFR 5038.
5040	 A/C	 10-05-74 Lost Canopus acquisition due to
bright particles.
	
Maintain roll drift
mode until Mercury encounter III.
5041	 A/C	 11-27-74 Yaw position exceeds limit, switch
amplifier did not fire.	 Exact cause
not determined.
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0 — LAUNCH — 1973 HEATERS FAILED (PFR 5001)
NOV 3 NOV SEA FAILURE (PFR 5007)
POWER ON RESET (FIRST TIME) (PFR 50)3)
1000 DEC PLATFORM STUCK AT 178° _ONE (PFR 5019)
LOW RF POWER (PFR 5020)
1974
- MAIN TO STANDBY TRANSFER (PFR 5021)
JA N
2000 VENUS_ -- STRUCTURAL/GIRO-GAS LOSS (PFR 5C.4)
ENCOUNTER TAPE STUCK (PFR 5025)
FEB 5 FEB
3000 SOLAR PANEL CURRENT (PFR 5027)
FIRST MAR 87-W LOSS, DAY 90 EVENT (PFR 5031)
— MERCURY— XTX POWER DROPPED (PFR 5032)
ENCOUNTER NO SWITCH-TWT TO LOW POWER (PFR 5033)MAR 29 APR
4000 FDS (1/2 TM) OUT (PFR 5034)
MAY
Z
O	 5000
JUNd
0
Z
O	 6000 JUL
O
D	 7000
AUG DSS TAPE STOPPED (PFR 5037)
O
s
SECOND SEP
— MERCURY-
8000 ENCOUNTER
SEPT 21
OCT
9000 NOV
YAW SWITCH AMP FAILED (PFR 5041)
DEC
10000
1975
JAN
11000
FEB
MAR 21
THIRD 1529 x 104 km (950 x 106 ml)1200')
—MERCURY— MAR S/C LOSES SUN AND CANOPUS
12144 ENCOUNTER TURN TWT OFF (LAST TIME)
MAR 16 END OF MISSION
Fig. 1.	 Mariner 10 significant spacecraft events
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power drop (PFR 5032); and (5) no Modulation/ Demodulation Subsystem (MDS)
response to DC-43 command (PFR 5033).
At least one of the failures involving block redundancy (main to standby
inverter switch, PFR 5021) and one of the failures where functional redun-
dancy was applied (roll axis oscillation, PFR 5024) would have been catas-
trophic to the mission without redundancy. One failure involving block
redundancy (the A/DC in the FDS, PFR 5034) occurred after the extended
mission had commenced but prior to the second encounter. Without redun-
dancy, it would probably have caused loss of the extended mission. There
was one failure where art unplannea extra power load (PFR 5031) was sup-
ported by the solar array, preventing mission failure. The solar array is
considered to be block redundant for this discussion.
Redundancy was effectively usc.0% to help keep the spacecraft operating
normally.
C. ANOMALOUS OCCURRENCES
A review of the 15 most significant problems and failures shows them
all to be anomalous occurrences, that is, occurrences which were not pre-
dicted and not anticipated or secondary occurrences resulting from another
event or failure.
The remaining problems or failures were a mix among anomalous
occurrences (AO), secondary occurrences (SO), and non-anomalous occur-
rences (NAO). The latter category is defined as a condition which was
understood, operating as designed, but not expected. These occurrences
are due to an imperfect understanding of the design, and hence, an errone-
ous prediction or interpretation of the performance. The three conditions
are summarized by PFR number.
AO s0 NAO
5001 ::• 5016 5028 5003 5002
5004 5017 5029 5006 5010
5005 5018 5030 5012 ;oil
5007* 5020::° 5031* 5019'• 5038
5008 5021* 5034` 5025, 5039
1009 5022 5035 5026 5040
5013' 5023 5036 5032
5014 5024:° 5041' 5031
5015 5027' 5037`
*15 most significant problems or fail
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VI. PARTS PROGRAM BACKGROUND
A. ELECTRONIC PARTS ENGINEERING
It is felt that a key element to the successful mission was an integrated
overall parts control program. Some elements of the program are identified
here to convey the extensiveness, completeness, and depth of controls uti-
lized on the project:
(1) Parts Control Documentation
(2) Parts Selection and Standardization
(3) Parts Qualification
(4) Specification Writing and Revi.ew
(5) Application Review and Stress Analysis
(6) Parts Control List
(7) Parts Ratir.g and Classification
(8) Screening, Monitoring, and Data Analysis
Tile result of the efforts applied by JPL and Boeing engineering was a
ii	 parts control program that supported the design engineers in the design/build/
test cycle of the hardware. Table 4 shows the quantity of parts per space-
craft by subsystem and by generic part type. Table 5 shows the number of
parts by part types rated acceptable (Q & A), conditionally acceptable (T),
unknov<m quality (Y), or unacceptable (X). See Table 6 for definitions of the
above ratings. In addition, for added background information, Table 7 iden-
tifies the electronic piece part yields from screening tests under Boeing
responsibility.
B. INTEGRATED CIRCUITS
The integrated circuit (IC) acquisition process was similar to that used
in the Mariner Mars 1971 Project. For the Toeing IC buy, JPL furnished
quality inspectors at the manufacturing sou r ce
 to perform pre-encapsulation
visual ins?ection. In addition, these inspectors performed source inspec-
tion for the JPL IC buy. JPL bought ICs for the CC&S, R FS, and TV Sub-
systems and supported the PSE Principal Investigator in source inspection
of his IC procurement.
18	 JPL Technical Memorandum 33-759
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Table 5, MVM'73 part type matrix
Part type Q A Y X T Totals
Capacitors 30 33 33 2 1 99
Crystals 6 6
Diodes 64 93 1s 2 177
Filtc rs 3 7 10
Fuses 3 3
Inductors 2 18 38 1 59
:Microcircuits 58 40 34 1 133
Relays 6 2 1 1 10
Resistors 54 20 21 1 4 IOC
Switches 1 1 2
Thermistors 4 2 1 1 g
Transformers 6 38 72 1 117
Transistors 40 59 38 16 153
Miscellaneou-- 1 2 3
Totals 268 316 264 23 9 880
aAttenuators, isolators, and motors.
Other flight science experimenters performed their own procurement
and control of parts. JPL and Boeing integrated circuit procurement speci-
fic- 1-ions included requirements for step-by-step product flow, process con-
tru.-, traceability and accountability, environmental tests, electrical tests,
operating burn-ins, and appropriate documentation. Primary attention was
given to material selection and in-process visual inspections, which were
I
LO
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1Table 6. Part reliability classifications
Classification	 Definition	 i
Ct On the current issue of the JPL Preferred Parts
List (or of same part family as a part on the JPL
PPL) or formally qualified by subcontractor, and
subcontractor's qualification test results
reviewed and found acceptable.
A	 Only liinited qualification/evaluation
performed; adequate for MVM'73 use; inay
or may not be further qualified.
i]
T	 Part (or part family) is on test or scheduled
for testing during current fiscal year.
Y	 Not recommended for spacecraft use based
upon lack of adequate reliability data, or
there is an indication from available history
that the part has certain characteristics
which make it less than desirable. 	 ► '
X	 Found to be inferior and definitely not recur.--
mended for spacecraft use. Use of the part
presents serious risk. (Project decision to use
was based on individual part application, as well
as cost and time constraints of qualification and
substitution actions. )
performed 100% at several inspection points by both the manufacturer's
quality assurance inspectors and by tint TPL residont source inspectors.
C. PARTS FAILURE ANALYSIS
There were 213 pant problems identified through the PFR system on
the MVM'73 Project prior to launch. Ninety of these parts were diagnosed by
JPL. A few parts, which by obvious mishandling or electrical overstress
during testing, were not diagnosed. The remainder of the parts problems
was diagnosed by Boeing or their subconi ractors.
Of the 213 prelaunch parts investigated, 95 were ICs, 33 were transis-
tors, and 9 were diodes. All parts that failed for unknown or questionable
reasons, or w`-ere the Cognizant Engineer or other personnel were concerned
in any way, were diagnosed for cause, and a failure analysis report was writ-
ten by JPL or Boeing.
JPL Technical Memorandum 33-759
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Table 7. Electronic part yields from screening (Boeing data)
Total parts Number
Part purchased rejected Yield, %
Capacitors 2714 857 68
Diodes 4673 1430 69
Fuses 495 188 62
Microcircuits 1305 215 84
Relays Z77 116 58
Resistors 16460 1878 89
Transformers 8 0 100
Transistors 1697 395 77
Before launch, all part problems were identified, analyzed, and
resolved. Those part problems of great(-st concern were discussed and
reviewed at the consent-to-launch meeting, along with associated risks so
that NASA and JPL management could jL dge the au>quucy of the fix and/or
risk.
VII. I PACECRAFT OPERATING ';ONFIGURATION AND
FAILURE RATE COMPUTATIONS
A. SPACECRAFT REDUNDANCY
To determine the number of piece parts that was operating during the
mission, the redundancy of the spacecraft system design was reviewed. Fig-
ure 2 is extracted from the Spacecraft System Requirements Docum p zt 615- 12,
Rev. A (Ref. 4) and shows those subsystem elements with redundancy.
22	 JPi. Technical Memorandum 33-759
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4.4	 RELIABILITY REQUIREMENTS
4.4.1	 Redundancy Requirements
Redundancy shall be applied in the following areas:
a) Two S-band RF po,ver amplifiers shall be provided, each
with its own power supply. Only one shall be operated at
a t ime.
b) Two S-band RF exciters shall be provided, each with its
own power supple. Only one shall be operated at a time.
c) Two power booster-regulator and main inverter chains
shall be provided. In the event of a failure of one of the
power booster-regulator and main inverter chains, it shall
automatically be removed from the line and the second
power chain shall be activated.
d) Dual pyrotechnic circuits shall be armed in parallel and
shall perform all eiectroexplosive functions in parallel.
e) The CC&S shall provide redundant capability for executing the
maneLv e.r segos-nce.
f) The modulations/demodulation subsystem shall provide
identical redundant '-,Aemetry modulation units. Only one
shall be operated at a time.
g) The articulation and p^)inting subsystem snail provide redun-
dant capability for addressing its output actuators.
h) The flight data subsystem shall include redundant oscillators..
power converters, and memories.
i) Dual attitude control gas assemblies shall be provided,
including storage tanks, regu'..:ors, valves and jets. In the
event of failure of one asse-nbly including loss of gas through
leakage, adequate torque capability and gas capacity snail
exist in the remaining assembly to cov.rol the S/C for the
duration of the mission where gas usage during the mission
is based on expected rather than worst-case conditions.
Fig. Z. Redundancy requirements (extracted from Ref. 4)
JPL Technical Memorandum 33-759
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B. SPACECRAFT OFERATING CONFIGURATION AND ELECTRONIC
PARTS COUNT
Redundant parts which were not powered were identified and accordingly
deleted from the KFS, MDS, Power, and FDS Subsystem parts count.
Table 8 is revised from Table 4 and lists all parts used in the failure rate
calculations of this report. Table 8 represents parts used in active cir-
cuits when power was applied to that subsystem.
The non-imaging science instruments were the responsibility of the
Principal Investigators. These instruments are the plasma science, charged
particle telescope, ultraviolet spectrometer, ma cy netometer and infrared
radiometer. Because these instruments used parts that were procured and
screened by each experimenter, there Nvas not the saine accountability of
parts in the procurement and processing cycle as there was for the engineer-
ing subsysterns. Also, the X-band transmitter was treated as an experiment
and did not have the same parts screening requirements. The above instru-
ments will not be used for failure rate determination in this paper. The
TVS did have identical attention paid to parts procurement, handling, and
screening like all other engineering subsystem parts and is included in the
parts failure rate determinations.
C. SPACECRAFT OFERATING TIME DURING THE MISSION
The mission commenced on November 3, 1973, and ended on March 24,
1975, for a total of 506 days or 12, 144 hours of operations. All engineering
subsystems were powered during the mission except the Data Storage Subsys-
tem (DSS). The DSS electronics were turned off after the DSS tape jammed
(PFR 5037). This was after 6936 hours of operation. The DSS transport had
about 1000 hours of running time. The TV Subsystem was turned on several
times for a total of 3077 hours during the mission.
D. ELECTRONIC PIECE PART FAILURE RATES
Because of the very limited number of failures during flight, all parts
in the calculations are kept grouped as a generic family, i.e., resistors,
capacitors, ICs, etc.
Data is too limited to compute useful failure rates for sub-generic
classes of parts. The reader is cautioned that even the generic failure rates
24	 JPL Technical Memorandum 33-759
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for some part types are not meaningful because of too few part hours. Where
there were no failures, a point estimate is computed assuming one failure.
This corresponds to about an upper 52% confidence limit. All operating piece
parts and part hours are included in the computations. All failure rates have
been computed two ways. The point estimate failure rate is found by assum-
ing one failure has occurred, and dividing that failure by the accumulated part
hours to obtain failures/hour. The 90% upper confidence level is found using
the chi-squared distribution. The meaning of the 90% upper confidence limit
can be seen as follows. Let X  be the computed upper 90% confidence limit
for the failure rate for a particular part type. Then there is a 90% probabil-
ity that k u is greater than the "true" failure rate for this part type and only a
10% chance that X u is less than the "true" failure rate.
Table 9 shows computed failure rates for Mariner 10. The data is dis-
played in such a manner that the reader may use this data in combination with
data from missions with similar heritage and develop a larger data sample.
At the first Mercury encounter, an 87-watt pnwer increase occurred
(PFR 5031). A short in Bay 1 was the most likely mechanism. No specific
piece part failure fits the failure model. It is not likely that an IC failure
would cause 87 watts of power dissipation. A diode is as likely to have
caused the failure as any other part, and to allow for this possibility a com-
putation was niade. See footnote c in Table 9.
The high-gain antenna drive dropped approximately 3 dB, 52 days after
launch (PFR 5020). The problem was verified as an S-band feed problem.
The fault was either inside the hybrid cavity or in the S-band radiating cavity.
The problem was intermittent in nature and 11 RFS state changes occurred
over a 69-day period, and then the problem cured itself. This was not an
electronic piece part failure.
Subsystem failures that were attributed to piece part failures during the
mission were: (1) Power Subsystem, main to standby inverter transfer (PFR
5021), a diode; (2) Flight Data Subsystem A/DC failure (PFR 5034), an IC;
and (3) altitude control yaw switch amplifier failure to fire; (PFR 5041), a
diode.
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Table 9. Flight failure  rate data for Mariner 10
Generic
part type
Operating
part hours (10 6 )
Failure rate,
Point estimate
10 -6 failures/hour
90% upper
confidence limit
Capacitors 34.76 0.029 0.067
Crystals 0.18 5.6 13.0
Diodes 45.02 0.044 (0. 008,0. 141)b,c
Filters 0.86 1.16 L.68
Fuses 1.04 o.96 2.21
Inductors 3.21 0.31 0.720
Integrated 43.45 0.023 (0.001,0.109)b
circuits
Relays 2.45 0.408 0.941
Resistors 100.19 0.010 0.023
Switches 0.07 14.0 33.0
Thermisters 0.17 5.9 1 3. 5
Transformers 3.31 0.30 0.701
Transistors 21.24 0.047 0.109
allote that for the case of no failures, the point estimate is computed
assuming one failure. This corresponds to about an upper 52 "D confi-
dence limit. Computed in the point estimate failure rate data are two
diode failures and one IC failure.
b These are 90% confidence intervals, when actual failures occurred.
c The point estimate assuming possibility of three diode failures is 0. 067
and the 90% confidence intervals are (0.018, 0. 172).
i
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E. DORMANCY CONSIDERATIONS FOR ELECTRONIC PIECE PARTS
The UVS and IRR experiments, as well as the TV Subsystem, «,ere
turned off (dormant) for major periods of time during the mission. In addi-
tion, one redundant RFS (exciter) and one redundant telemetry portion of the
MDS were turned off at any given time during the mission. There were no
part failures experienced in those equipments during the time they were
turned on or off. The accumulative non-operating part hours are summar-
ized in Table 10. Only dormant hours followed by power turn-on conditions
are displayed in this table. These data are presented to give a quantitative
expression of dormancy considerations relative to electronic piece parts.
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Table 10. Dormancy `` part hours of hardware on Mariner 10
^I
Subsystem or	 In-flight hours of
experiment	 Total piece	 parts	 non-operation
UVS	 737	 9196
IRR	 411	 11491
RFS (exciter)	 567	 )2144
and one TWTA
TVS	 2982	 9067
MDS	 551	 12144
(1/2 TMU)
Non-operating
part hours ( 106)
6.8
4.7
6.9
27. 0
6.7
Total part hours	 52.1
aAll equipments were turned on during or after encounter III with no
problems /failures.
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